| 主讲人简介： | Kathleen Segerson is a Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of Connecticut. Her research focuses on the incentive effects of alternative environmental policy instruments, including applications in the following areas: groundwater contamination, hazardous waste management, land use regulation, climate change and nonpoint pollution from agriculture. In addition, she has worked on valuing ecosystem services and the protection of marine species. Dr. Segerson is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, and a fellow of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (AERE) and of the American Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA). She has or is currently serving on a number of advisory boards, including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Science Advisory Board (SAB) and the Committee on Valuing the Protection of Ecological Systems and Services (CVPESS), the National Academy of Science Advisory Committee for the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) and Review Panel on the National Climate Assessment, the National Research Council’s Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources (BANR), the U.S. National Member Organization of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), and the Advisory Board of the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics in Stockholm. Dr. Segerson holds a PhD from Cornell University and a BA from Dartmouth College. |
| 讲座简介： | Policies where rewards or punishments are based on collective (rather than individual) performance have been studied in a variety of environmental and natural resource management contexts. However, to date, the literature has considered only the incentives for individual parties to exert an efficient amount of effort to reduce pollution or meet resource management goals. In team production settings such as these, in addition to exerting effort to improve their own performance, individuals can also undertake activities that instead help another improve their performance. This paper presents a model of collective approaches that incorporates both effort and help and uses the model to answer the following questions: (1) when might a social planner want to incentivize help (in addition to effort), and (2) how can help be incentivized? I first identify conditions under which providing some positive amount of help is efficient. I then argue that a traditional policy approach based on individual performance cannot generally incentivize both efficient effort and efficient help, but a collective approach where rewards or punishments are based on group performance can (if properly designed). This suggests an additional potential rationale for the use of collective approaches that has not been recognized in the literature. In addition to the general model, I also present a more specific model where help takes the form of information sharing, using the example of vessels sharing information about bycatch hotspots to motivate. Examining this specific context highlights some important caveats to the results derived for the general model and the conditions under which those results would hold. |
