科学研究

Dr. Chenyang Li an assistant professor in IPE Thrust (department), at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (GZ). Driven by a passion for bridging the gap between economic theory and empirical works in the fields of game theory and industrial organization. 

 

His research encompasses both economic theory and empirical projects. In his theory papers, he delves into understanding how communication network structures influence the success of group collective action. The implications of his research findings extend to various fields, including firm management and anti-corruption. In addition, his other empirical projects are focused on the digital economy, pricing strategy on online platforms, and the interaction between online and offline businesses.

 

He is committed to generating new insights that can benefit both the academic community and the industry at large. He looks forward to sharing my research findings and contributing to the discourse on economics.

Many real-world organizations face the threat of internal collusion, where a fraction of members conspire to exploit regulatory loopholes or abuse their power for personal gain. In contrast to existing literature, this paper considers the case that colluding members may provide cover for each other, evading punishment even if non-colluding members report their activities.

The collusion formation process is modeled as a bargaining process through a personal connection or friendship network, as corruption attempts are not made public. The analysis reveals that collusion is less likely to occur in networks with sparser connections. In particular,  star and ring networks present the greatest challenges for collusion. For arbitrary communication networks, an algorithm is developed to identify the potential for collusion among individual players, enabling policymakers to enhance detection and control of corruption.

This research contributes valuable insights into the fields of anti-corruption, anti-trust, firm management, political bargaining, social movements, and revolutions. It is particularly relevant in cases where principals struggle to impose punishment following successful collusion.